AgBioForum, 11(2): 134-144. ©2008 AgBioForum.

Pricing and Welfare Impacts of New Crop Traits: The Role of IPRs and
Coase’s Conjecture Revisited
Richard K. Perrin and Lilyan E. Fulginiti
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

Crop traits are durable when embedded in varieties, and thus
they may be subject to Coase’s conjecture that monopolists who
sell durables may be unable to earn normal monopoly rents, or
in the extreme case, not any rents at all. To determine the potential relevance of this conjecture for the crop traits market, we
analyze the theoretical time path of trait prices under three systems of intellectual property rights (utility patents, plant breeders’ rights, and none), alternative assumptions about sellers’
ability to commit to future action, and alternative assumptions
that buyers are either myopic or far-sighted with respect to
expectations about the future price of the durable. Under only
one of these stylized circumstances does the Coase conjecture
have traction, but it is a plausible circumstance in much of the
world—owners with plant breeders’ rights, buyers with foresight,
sellers unable to commit to future price paths. In this circumstance, this theory suggests that sellers holding only plant
breeders rights would realize only 11% of potential social welfare benefits from the trait, while farmers and/or downstream
consumers would realize about 85%. On the other hand, with
myopic buyers under any system of intellectual property rights,
temporal price discrimination is feasible, resulting in above-normal monopolist welfare (about 70% of maximum social welfare
benefits) and little damage to consumers relative to normal
monopoly pricing.
Key words: crop traits, Coase, durable monopoly, timeinconsistency, IPRs.

Individual crop traits at one time were inextricably
packaged in the germplasm matrix of individual varieties or hybrids that farmers planted. That has changed.
Scientists are now able to use genetic modification
(GM) techniques to transfer traits previously unknown
in a crop species into existing crop varieties and hybrids
with desirable agronomic and product traits. An early
example is the toxin-producing trait known as Bt, which
was transferred from a bacterium into corn and cotton to
provide protection from insects. The biotechnology
firms that specialize in identifying new traits and methods of transfer are not necessarily the same firms that
specialize in producing varieties and hybrids for sale to
farmers. Consequently, many crop traits are now marketed by biotechnology firms to seed companies, who in
turn incorporate them into their existing lines for sale to
farmers. It is this market for crop traits that is the subject
of analysis in this study.
A crop trait of this type is a durable input if it is
introduced into an open pollinated variety (OPV) of a
crop, because the farmer can use the harvested crop as
seed for subsequent crops that will in turn exhibit the
trait. Furthermore, if the biotechnology firms can pro-

tect these traits with intellectual property rights (IPRs),
this market has the peculiarities of the monopolist selling a durable (dubbed a “durapolist” by Orbach, 2004).
The durapolist has an incentive to price discriminate
through time, setting a high price for the durable in the
first period to “skim” off the buyers willing to pay the
highest price, then lowering the price in each subsequent
period so as to capture a large fraction of consumers’
surplus. However, according to Coase’s (1972) original
conjecture, it seems likely that potential buyers will be
aware of this incentive and simply wait for the price to
fall, with the result in the extreme case that the
durapolist will be quickly forced to sell the durable at
marginal cost and realize no monopoly profits at all.
There have been numerous extensions and applications
of Coase’s original insight allowing an understanding
of, for example, unlawful reproductions of patented
technology. These include copying (or ‘pirating’) of different types of media, print, and software. Waldman
(2003) presents a complete and useful review of this literature.
In the agricultural economics literature, a number of
papers address the issue of pricing of GM technology,
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but only three address the time-related issues associated
with the pricing of seeds that embody IPR-protected
traits. Perrin and Fulginiti (2004) described multi-year
equilibrium time paths for prices, implied by a Coasian
model that in retrospect appears inappropriate to the
seed market. Burton, Love, Ozertan, and Taylor (2005)
developed a two-period model to examine the implications of genetic use restricted technologies (GURTs),
which eliminate the trait after the first crop, versus
short- or long-term contracts for use of seed. Ambec,
Langinier, and Lemarie (2008) develop a two-period
model to examine the incentives for the seed firm to
produce a non-durable seed, such as a hybrid, rather
than a durable seed. In contrast to these other papers, the
role of this article is to re-examine the time-inconsistency issue in multiple-year equilibrium price paths relevant to seed markets in countries that enforce plant
breeders rights, but lack the patent protection for seeds,
which in most industrialized countries allows seed firms
to price their seeds as non-durables. In this article we
will then examine the market structure for crop traits to
consider when it is likely that crop trait owners are limited in their ability to extract normal monopoly profits
by the time inconsistency problem. We will see that, in
addition to alternative institutional regimes, outcomes
are sensitive to farmers’ expectations regarding future
trait price and whether or not the seller is able to credibly commit to future price announcements. We will further consider the welfare implications of these
outcomes.

Market Structure for Traits
Characteristics of the market that are important in determining the theoretical time path of trait prices are (1) the
durability of the trait, (2) the nature of intellectual property rights available to the trait owner, (3) the foresight
of buyers with respect to future trait prices, and (4) the
ability of the monopolist to credibly commit to future
actions. Trait durability does vary depending on the kind
of seed into which the trait is incorporated; property
rights regimes in seed markets also vary around the
world, and while firms in general cannot credibly commit to future behavior, it is conceivable. We now
describe these characteristics of trait markets in more
detail.
Durability of a Crop Trait
A crop trait will be a durable good only if it is transferred into a traditional open pollinated variety (OPV),
as opposed to a hybrid. Hybrid seed, as the term is nor-

mally used in the seed market, does not “breed true,”
that is, the seeds of the harvested crop will produce a
polyglot of plant types of little or no commercial value.
This is because the production technique crosses two
inbred lines, each of a homogeneous genotype but distinct from one another, in such a way that the hybrid
plants themselves are very uniform, but that uniformity
is lost with the genetic heterogeneity in the seeds produced by the hybrid plant. Hence, if a trait is transferred
to a hybrid, the trait is generally not a durable, the
durapoly issue does not arise, and the analysis of this
study is not relevant.
In contrast to a hybrid, the seeds and plants of OPVs
are self-replicating. Varieties are developed by the
recurrent selection, over several generations, of plants
conforming to a set of desired characteristics. The plants
in the population that emerge from this process in general are virtually identical, both in appearance and in
genetic structure, so the harvested seeds can be saved
and planted for subsequent crops with little deterioration
of traits over several generations. Therefore, if a trait is
introduced into an OPV, it will generally be a durable
good. If genetic drift and contamination is substantial, it
would alter the durability properties of the trait. This
does not materially affect the comparisons in our analysis.
The above discussion of the durability of traits is
subject to modification by some emerging technologies,
namely GURTS and apomixes. GURTs (also known
more colorfully as “terminator technology” or “suicide
seeds”) either turn off the trait in seeds of the farm-produced harvest or make those seeds infertile, eliminating
the durability of a trait embodied in a variety. Apomixes
technology allows hybrid plants to produce clone-like
seeds that duplicate the genotype of the hybrid seed,
thus imparting durability to traits embodied in hybrids
(Vielle Calsada, Crane, & Stelly, 1996). GURT technology is available, but is not presently being used, apparently because of political reasons. Apomixes has not yet
been commercialized, apparently because of technical
problems.
A substantial fraction of the world’s crops are
planted as OPVs, and it is anticipated that the number of
GM traits available for them will increase rapidly in the
next few years. Wheat, soybeans, cotton, and subsistence crops are commonly produced as OPVs, whereas
crops such as maize and sorghum are produced commercially as hybrids in most areas of the world. James
(2007) estimates that as of 2007, about 60% of the world
soybean acreage and 18% of world cotton acreage was
planted to varieties that incorporated patented traits. The
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potential for even more widespread use of GM traits in
varieties suggests that the durapoly issue is relevant and
worth examining.
IPRs for Crop Traits
Crop traits are subject to two systems of intellectual
property rights (IPRs) that convey different sets of
monopoly rights to crop trait owners (see Perrin, 1994,
for a static analysis of how these IPRs might affect agriculture in developing countries). The first of these is
plant breeders’ rights (PBRs), an intellectual property
rights convention developed in the 1960’s and now subscribed to by 46 countries, coordinated under the Union
for the Protection of Varieties, or UPOV. PBRs were
established in the United States with the 1970 Plant
Variety Protection Act. The second IPR system is the
standard utility patent system, which first became available for biological innovations such as crop traits in the
United States, the European Union, and a few other
countries beginning in the 1980’s.
The rights conveyed to the owner differ between the
two systems (Tripp, Louwaars, & Eaton, 2007). Under
plant breeders’ rights, the farmer who buys a variety can
replant seed from his harvest for most crops but does not
have the right to convey his harvest to others for use as
seed. Given that traits embodied in the seeds of varieties
are durable, this situation would seem to conform to the
durapolist market structure: a monopolist selling a durable good to a group of competitive buyers. However,
once the buyers’ harvest enters the market, it provides a
near-perfect substitute for traits offered for sale by the
trait owner, posing a threat to the monopoly status of the
trait owner after the first year of sales. Because of this
glut of potential competitors, the ability of the trait
owner to enforce his property rights, and the cost of that
enforcement, play a crucial role in pricing of a trait
embodied in a PBR-protected variety. With a very weak
property rights system (or none at all), the monopolist is
no longer a monopolist after the first year of sales
because the crop marketed by every first-year adopter
carries the trait and is available to other producers at
essentially zero cost by simply purchasing the seed in
the commodity market channel at the common commodity price. A collapse of the trait price due to such a
property rights failure is of course a different phenomenon from a collapse associated with the time-inconsistency of Coase’s conjecture.
On the other hand, if a crop trait is protected by a
utility patent, the trait owner has the additional right to
exclude even the buyer from replanting the seed con-

taining the trait. To implement this exclusion, sellers
often require buyers of varieties with patented traits to
sign a technology agreement in which they agree to not
replant the seed. Under US law it is illegal for the farmer
to replant such seeds even in the absence of an explicit
technology agreement. The trait in this case is no longer
a durable, or at least not a legal durable. A trait owner
who obtains a utility patent thus avoids the durapoly
dilemma by eliminating the durability of the trait. The
trait owner is then essentially in the position of offering
one-year leases of the trait, a situation similar to that of
placing the trait in a hybrid. Again, however, the feasibility and cost of enforcing the no-replant restriction
determines whether the seller can avoid the Coase outcome.
While utility patents are clearly the stronger form of
property rights, they are not available everywhere for
crop traits, and they are more expensive to obtain than
breeders’ rights, so both systems persist.
Buyer Foresight and Seller Commitment
The heart of the difficulty faced by a durapoly is a timeinconsistency problem, in that its optimal behavior in
the future will be inconsistent with its optimal plan for
the present and the future together. For example, the initial optimal sales strategy may be to offer seed for sale
just once, at the profit-maximizing price in the first
period, with no further sales in the future. Yet when the
future arrives, willing buyers remain in the market and it
is then optimal for the firm to sell again at a new
monopoly price appropriate for the remaining demand
curve. Recognizing that possibility in advance however,
buyers in the first period will hold out for the lower
future price, and first-period sales won’t match the
seller’s expectations. If the durapolist lowers the initial
price in response, this may reinforce buyers’ hold-out
strategy, forcing the price downward toward marginal
cost, perhaps even “in the twinkling of an eye,” as
Coase conjectured.
If however the firm can credibly commit to its exante optimal future behavior despite the time-inconsistency of its incentives,1 buyers’ incentives to wait will
be altered, and the seller could implement the ex-ante
optimal strategy. Firms in many industries do find ways

1. Waldman, in a survey article on pricing of durables, notes
that the time-inconsistency problem arises with respect to any
subsequent firm behavior affecting the market value of units
previously sold (such as new product development), not just
future price and quantity decisions.
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Figure 1. User evaluations of the benefit of a trait.

Figure 2. User evaluations decline as years pass.

to commit to future sales or price behavior, through buyback programs, destruction of molds or templates,
establishing a record of persistent behavior, etc. In fact,
Waldman suggests that the main value of Coase’s conjecture is to help us understand a variety of observed
contractual strategies intended to avoid the Coase result,
which are otherwise inexplicable.
But if buyers are myopic and therefore base their
purchase decision solely on today’s price, giving no
thought to the possible future price, the firm can engage
in intertemporal price discrimination, achieving more
than normal monopoly rents. While this is not a very
plausible model of buyer behavior, it is useful to identify
the implications for equilibrium price paths for comparison with alternative assumptions.
We now turn to an analysis of the equilibrium trait
pricing paths under these stylized market structures and
the associated distributions of welfare benefits.

payoffs, realized at the end of the crop season, from zero
to one. If the density of plot valuations is uniform, the
market demand curve at the beginning of the season for
a single year will be linear, v = δ (1-Q), where the discount factor is δ = 1/(1+i), and Q indexes the units on
which the valuation is made (lower line in Figure 1).
This is a plausible approximation of annual demand for
such GM crop traits as insect and herbicide resistance,
as both pest pressures and the efficiency of alternative
pest-control technologies will vary across parcels.
We suppose the trait to be a durable in the sense that
it has a calendar life of T calendar years from the date of
its introduction, after which its value becomes nil, due
to the emergence of superior technologies after T years
(obsolescence) or due to lost efficacy (depreciation).
The present value of the flow of services from a durable
trait when it is introduced is thus V0 = k0(1-Q), where
k0 = [1-(1+i)-T]/i, the present value of a unit annuity
starting at time t = 1, one year from release, and continuing through time t = T. The durable will decline in value
as the end of the T-year calendar period approaches, as
illustrated in Figure 2, with the schedule of buyers’ valuations of the durable t years after it is introduced being
Vt = kt(1-Q), where kt = [1-(1+i)-(T-t)] /i.
It is a reasonable approximation for our purposes to
assume that the marginal cost of incorporating the trait
into additional seed stocks is zero, so that all revenues
from the trait represent the trait owner’s rent or producer
surplus. Consumers’ surplus is measured as the area
under the valuation curve and above the price line,
though we note that this surplus will not necessarily be
realized by farmers, as it may be passed along in part or
in whole to downstream consumers via lower product
prices. The maximum harvest-time social surplus from

The Maximum Social Welfare Benefit
(MSWB) of a Crop Trait
Welfare is measured here in terms of traditional consumer and producer surplus—areas between the price
line and the demand curve and supply curve, respectively. The consumer benefits may accrue to downstream market participants as well as farmers. The
demand curve for the current services of a crop trait is
derived from the harvest-time payoffs of the trait on heterogeneous plots of land. This payoff can be due either
to a reduction of unit production cost or to added crop
value, or both. Without loss of generality, we can consider plots to vary continuously with respect to potential
payoff from the trait, and we can scale the range of these
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Table 1. Theoretical social welfare achieved, relative to the maximum social welfare benefit achievable from a trait.
Intellectual property rights regime
Market characteristic Welfare recipients

Strong patents

Strong plant breeders
rights

None

Myopia

Trait owners
Consumers
Total social welfare

0.69*
0.24*
0.93*

0.69*
0.24*
0.93*

0.50
0.47*
0.97*

Foresight w/
commitment

Trait owners
Consumers
Total social welfare

0.50
0.25
0.75

0.50
0.25
0.75

0.06*
0.91*
0.97*

Foresight w/o
commitment

Trait owners
Consumers
Total social welfare

0.50
0.25
0.75

0.11*
0.84*
0.95*

(as above)

*These fractions will vary with trait life, T, and interest rate, i, here 10 years and .05, respectively.

the trait (area below the valuation curve out to the level
of adoption) is thus 0.5. If the trait is a durable that will
repeat these benefits for T years, the maximum social
welfare benefit from the trait (present value of social
surplus) is
MSWB =

k0
2

(1)

As another benchmark, we refer to “normal monopoly profit” as the area (k0/2)/2 = k0/4. This corresponds
to the maximum revenue a monopolist could obtain for
a good with zero marginal cost, obtainable by charging
P = k0/2 and selling Q0 =1/2 units. For this solution, the
present value of producer surplus (owner revenue) is k0/
4 = (1/2)MSWB, the present value of consumer surplus
is k0/8 = (1/4)MSWB, and (1/4)MSWB is lost because
of the restricted use of the trait—inefficiency due to
market power.
In what follows, we contrast the welfare distribution
of various expected market outcomes relative to this
potential welfare standard.

Pricing and Welfare Outcomes Under
Stylized Market Structures
With No IPRs
If no effective property rights exist, the trait owner loses
all market power the year following introduction,
because grain in the commodity markets consists of viable seeds carrying the trait, and this seed can be had for
little or no premium over the common market price of
the crop. If buyers have foresight, they will anticipate
this price collapse, and the demand curve facing the trait
owner at time t = 0 is that for just one year of benefits,

or P = δ (1-Q). The optimal price is P0 = δ/2, Q0 = 1/2,
and adoption will reach 100% in the second year when
the price is zero. Note that this price equals half of the
benefit the highest beneficiary expects to receive the
first year, as plotted on Figure 3.
Producer surplus (trait owner revenue) amounts to
δ /4, which for T = 10 and i = 0.05, equals 0.06 MSWB.
The present value of consumer surplus consists of that
for first-year buyers ((k0/2 - δ/2)/2 + k0/8) plus the discounted value of that for second-year buyers δ (k1/8) for
a total of 0.91 MSWB, for a total social welfare benefit
of 97% of the maximum available from the trait (Table
1, last column). These values are a function of time horizon, T, and interest rate, i. For combinations of T from 5
to 20 years and i from 0.01 to 0.20, owner benefits range
from 0.03 to 0.14 MSWB (for T = 20, i = 0.01; and T =
5, i =0.20, respectively). Consumer benefits range from
0.96 to 0.79 MSWB and total social benefits are above
93% in all cases. Social welfare benefits are high
because nearly complete adoption occurs immediately—time horizon and discount rate have their primary effect on the distribution of these maximum
benefits, rather than the total social benefits realized.
In the unlikely event that all buyers are myopic with
respect to future prices of the trait, the trait owner can
charge the higher monopoly price P0 = k0/2 the first
year, and half the potential customers will purchase
because future trait price is irrelevant to myopic buyers.
As shown in Figure 3, for a 10-year trait and i = 0.05,
this price amounts to about four times the annual benefit
the highest beneficiary expects, and eight times the price
that could be charged in the foresight case above. A year
later the price collapses and the remaining half of potential buyers adopt the trait. Owner benefits are 50%
MSWB, normal monopoly profit. Consumer benefits
equal k0/8 the first year and k1/8 the second, or 0.47
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Figure 3. Equilibrium time paths of trait price, Pt, for T = 10, i = 0.05.

MSWB given T = 10 and i = 0.05. For the range of T and
i mentioned above, present value of consumer surplus
ranges from 0.43 to 0.46 MSWB, while owner benefits
remain at 0.50 MSWB.
IPRs with Myopic Buyers: Intertemporal Price
Discrimination
Myopic buyers will purchase the durable whenever its
price is at or below the buyer’s valuation, disregarding
what the price of the durable might be next year.
If the trait is protected by either a strong patent or
PBR system, the owner may choose to sell the trait as a
durable. (By “strong” IPR’s, we mean that enforcement
is perfect and costless). Because myopic buyers ignore
future prices, the owner is free to seek higher-than-normal monopoly profits by charging a higher price the first
year than in subsequent years—price discrimination
through time. Here, we determine the optimal time path
of prices by backward induction (see Stokey, 1979, for a
generalized continuous-time solution to similar intertemporal price discrimination problems). At any given
time t, given Pt-1 and Qt-1 such that Pt-1 = kt-1(1-Qt-1),
the owner chooses Pt to maximize current revenue, i.e.,

⎧⎪
⎛P
P ⎞ ⎫⎪
max ⎨ Pt (Qt − Qt −1 ) = Pt ⎜ t −1 − t ⎟ ⎬ ,
Pt
⎝ k t −1 k t ⎠ ⎭⎪
⎩⎪

(2)

intertemporal price discrimination. The initial price is
more than five times the highest annual benefit, and falls
slowly (see the example in Figure 3, labeled “IPRs,
myopia”). At time t = 0, the pricing problem and its
solution are (Note: PVR=Present Value of Revenue)
T −1

⎫
⎧ PVR = P (Q ) + δ t P (Q − Q )
∑
t
t
t −1
0
0
⎪⎪
⎪⎪
t =1
max ⎨
⎬,
T −1
P0
P
k P 1 P
⎪
= P0 (1 − 0 ) + ∑ δ t ( tt 0 )( t 0 ) ⎪
k0
2 k0 2 k0 ⎭⎪
⎪⎩
t =1

which solves for the optimal price:
P0* =

(3)

k0
1
,
2 (1 − σ k0 )
1 T −1 ⎛ δ ⎞
∑⎜ ⎟ kt .
k02 t=1 ⎝ 4 ⎠
t

where σ =

Under this pattern of intertemporal price discrimination, welfare distribution is determined by examination
of welfare rectangles and triangles each year. For the
case of a 10-year trait and 5% discount rate, these benefits are as follows (these results and those for other cases
are summarized in Table 1):

which yields the solution Pt = (kt / 2kt-1)Pt-1, and by
recursive substitution we determine that for t > 0,
Pt = (kt / 2tk0)P0, thus establishing the optimal path of
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Figure 4. Cumulative diffusion of Trait Qt, for T = 10.

IPRs with Far-sighted Buyers (Coase)
Owner welfare:
k
1
1 1
PVR= 0
MSWB | = .69 MSWB
=
i=.05
4 (1− σk0 ) 2 (1− σk0 )
T=10
(4)

Consumer welfare:
Present Value of Cons. Surplus (PVCS) |

Total social welfare |

i=.05
T=10

i=.05
T=10

= .24 MSWB

= .93 MSWB.

Under price discrimination, 93% of the potential
social welfare from the trait is realized, although trait
owners capture 69% compared to only 24% by consumers. Optimal prices under this market structure follow a
declining fraction of the previous year’s price that
approaches zero (Figure 3), while adoption approaches
100% (Figure 4).
It is obvious that MSWB will vary greatly with T
and i. However, we have found that again in this case
the share distribution of those benefits is quite insensitive to T and i. For a 5-year trait at 20% discount rate,
owner-consumer-total shares of MSWB are 65%-22%87%, while for a 20-year trait at zero discount, those
numbers are 73%-25%-98%. All combinations of
5 < T < 20 and 0 < i < 0.30 resulted in distributions
within these bounds.

If buyers are far-sighted, Coase noted that they will not
purchase the durable today, even though it is profitable,
if it will be even more profitable to wait until next year.
Their behavior depends upon what they expect the selling price to be in coming years. Because of the timeinconsistency problem, sellers may prefer a different
future price than the one they initially announce, so their
ability to credibly commit to such announcements is an
important determinant of the equilibrium time path of
prices.
With No Seller Commitment. If the seller is unable to
commit to a future pricing scheme, he must choose a
time path for prices that is consistent with far-sighted
buyers’ strategy. To be explicit, for buyers at time
t < (T-1) to be willing to buy at time t rather than wait,
the present value of buying now must be equal to or
greater than the present value of waiting until the following year. For the marginal buyer at time t, who is
indexed by Qt, the present values of buying now and
waiting must be equal, or

Vt (Qt) – Pt = δ [Vt+1(Qt) – Pt+1], or
kt (1–Qt) – Pt = δ [kt+1(1–Qt) – Pt+1], or,
given that (kt – δ kt+1) = δ,
Qt = 1–

1

δ

Pt

(5)

+ Pt+1.

Perrin & Fulginiti — Pricing and Welfare Impacts of New Crop Traits: The Role of IPRs and Coase’s Conjecture Revisited

AgBioForum, 11(2), 2008 | 141

To determine the optimal recursive path for prices,
we again use backward induction. At the time of final
trait sales, t = (T-1), the owner’s problem is

1+ δ
⎧
⎛P
⎞⎫
max ⎨PT −1 ( QT −1 − QT −2 ) = PT −1 ⎜ T −2 −
PT −1 ⎟⎬ ,
PT −1
δ
δ
⎝
⎠⎭
⎩
which solves as

(6)

PT -1 = PT −2 / 2 (1 + δ ) .
For t < (T-1), price is constrained by the relationship in
Equation 5, and the problem each of those years is
⎧
⎛ Pt −1 1 + δ
⎞⎫
max ⎨ Pq
−
Pt + Pt +1 ⎟ ⎬ ,
t t = Pt ( Qt − Qt ) = Pt ⎜
Ptt
δ
⎝ δ
⎠⎭
⎩
(7)
which solves as

Pt = (Pt-1 + δ Pt+1) / 2(1+δ ) which can be written
Pt = 2(1+δ )Pt+1 – δ Pt+2.
In principle, one can use Equations 6 and 7 recursively
to express every Pt in terms of PT-1, so that one could
then choose PT-1 to maximize the present value of revenues, similar to the procedure in Equation 3 above.
However, this analytical approach proved to be too cumbersome for us to solve for traits with lives longer than
about 5 years, so we use a search procedure. Using
Equation 6 and the last expression in Equation 7, we
could numerically evaluate every Pt in terms of the next
two later prices (one later price in the case of PT-2), and
we then obtained the optimum value of PT-1 by numerical search.
The optimal price path for T = 10 and i = 0.05 begins
with P0 = 0.82, or 82% of the highest annual benefit,
and declines rapidly to less than 0.01 by t = 4, as shown
by the dashed line in Figure 3. These levels were again
not very sensitive to choice of T and i.2 Here the implications of the Coase conjecture are evident: while the
price of the durable is not forced to zero (because prices
are not updated continuously, but rather annually), the
price path is very low, and trait owner welfare is only
11% of MSWB. Farmers, on the other hand, very
quickly come to full adoption (Figure 4), and achieve a
welfare gain equal to 84% MSWB.

2. For T = 5, i = 0.05: P0 = 0.81 and price fell below 0.01 at
T = 4. For T = 10, i = 0.20: P0 = 0.70 and price fell below
0.01 at T = 4. For T = 5, i = 0.20: P0 = 0.70 and price fell
below 0.01 at T = 4.

While owners holding either patent rights or PBRs
have the option of selling the trait as a durable with this
result, those with patent rights can do much better by
leasing the trait. Trait leases commonly prohibit farmerbuyers from replanting the seed, either through an
explicit purchase “technology agreement” or by implicit
threat of lawsuit. This option not permitted under
PBR’s. The optimal annual lease rate is δ/2, resulting in
sales to one-half the market every year. With the lease
option, patent owners realize a normal monopoly rent
from the trait, achieving a welfare gain of 0.5 MSWB,
while consumers achieve a welfare gain of 0.25 MSWB,
the usual consumer gain under monopoly. Thus, when
sellers are unable to commit to a future course of action,
patent holders can achieve normal monopoly rents via
the leasing option, while PBR holders suffer the consequences of the Coase conjecture, and realize welfare
benefits in the vicinity of one-fifth of normal monopoly
rents.
Tirole (1988) examined the Coase conjecture for the
case of a durable with an infinite stream of non-declining benefits, rather than the constant but finite stream of
benefits that we consider here. Perrin and Fulginiti
(2004) previously applied the Tirole model to trait pricing. The set-up posed by Tirole involves a number of
assumptions that are less appropriate to trait pricing than
are market structures we have considered above. His
model assumes that buyers collude in jointly selecting a
limit price, a completely implausible characterization of
farmer-buyers. It considers a durable with infinite,
rather than limited, life. And he imposes the condition
that the price the seller chooses in each period must be a
constant fraction of the marginal buyer’s valuation,
which in general is not the optimal time path for a durable of finite life. We conclude that the results from
Tirole’s model, as developed by Perrin and Fulginiti, are
far less likely to represent alternative trait pricing outcomes than the results of the model developed just
above.
With Seller Commitment. If sellers are able to commit
to a future course of action, trait owners can achieve
normal monopoly profits, regardless of the type of IPR.
They simply announce that the trait will be sold only on
the release date, t = 0, for the normal monopoly price,
P0 = k0/2, and that no further sales will be made. Since
the trait owner can prohibit producers from adopting the
trait unless they purchase at the initial offering, even farsighted buyers will be willing to buy as long as the price
is lower than their own valuation, thus insuring sales of
Q0 = 1/2. Thus if sellers are able to commit to future
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action, the welfare distribution is the normal monopoly
distribution, with sellers achieving 0.5 MSWB and consumers realizing 0.25 MSWB. This scenario has seldom
been found to be plausible, and certainly it is not in the
case of crop traits, where farmers typically require years
of observation and testing before adoption occurs.

course our conclusions are consistent with those of the
very different model of Ambec et al. (2008), who find
that trait owners prefer nondurables (hybrids) to durables (inbred lines), while farmers and society prefer the
opposite.

Some Empirical Observations
Summary of Pricing Outcomes

In Table 1 we summarize the welfare results from the six
environments considered. The corresponding price
paths and adoption paths, for a trait with a 10-year life
and a real discount rate of i = 0.05, are shown in Figures
3 and 4. Trait owners are clearly better off if buyers are
myopic, but that does not seem very likely. Otherwise,
the best the owners can do is obtain normal monopoly
profits, but they will do much worse in the case of PBR
ownership without owner commitment, in which the
implications of the Coase conjecture are felt. This particular circumstance, PBR’s with buyer foresight but no
owner commitment, is relevant to many countries of the
world where patents on traits are not permitted but
PBR’s are. Trait owners have relatively small incentives
to enter these markets, because the Coase conjecture
limits them to only about 11% of MSWB, and if the
PBR’s are not costlessly enforceable (as seems likely),
even less.
Consumers will of course benefit most from the trait
in the absence of any IPRs, but it is surprising that they
would do almost that well in the case of PBRs with sellers unable to commit. Total social welfare is maximized
with no property rights in the short run, but returns to
owners are so low that long-run welfare may be damaged due to lack of new inventions. Of the circumstances considered, buyer myopia is virtually a Paretobest circumstance regardless of IPR regime, but it is
hard to imagine a country in which this is a plausible
representation of reality.
Compared to the model considered by Burton et al.
(2005), this article examines multiple-year rather than
two-year horizons, but also considers results when farmers do not have perfect expectations with respect to
future prices, and when trait owners can commit to
future pricing. Under the assumptions common to these
two studies (farmers have foresight and firms lack commitment), our welfare conclusions are consistent with
theirs, i.e., PBRs (essentially equivalent to their longterm contracts) yield higher farmer and social welfare,
but lower trait owner benefits as compared to patents
(essentially equivalent to their TPS option which allows
annual pricing without need for monitoring). And of

Recent studies of the world commercialization of the
Monsanto-owned Bt insect-resistance trait in cotton provide some idea of the empirical relevance of these scenarios. In India, where no IPRs for varieties or traits had
been available prior to 2005, Bt cotton was introduced
in hybrid cotton and Qaim (2003) found that in 2001 the
Bt hybrid seed cost farmers 287% more than a non-Bt
counterpart. As a hybrid, there would have been little
incentive for farmers to save seed, so this premium is
essentially a lease rate on the trait, allowing the seed
company to reap normal monopoly rents equal to about
half the potential social benefits. But Tripp et al. (2007)
report that by 2004, the monopoly was substantially
eroded by clandestine breeding to incorporate the Bt
gene. New seed laws may reduce this “piracy,” but without enforcement of such laws, it seems evident that in
most countries even hybrids will not provide a safe
monopoly for long.
In China, on the other hand, Bt cotton was introduced by transferring US cotton varieties to be sold
through state and private seed companies. Pray, Huang,
Hu, and Rozelle (2002) found that the first-year (1999)
price carried no premium, in 2000 it was 181% higher
for the Bt variety, and by 2001 it was 333% higher.
While this would seem to reflect a “get-acquainted”
pricing scheme for a well-protected trait, there was
apparently no effective enforcement of IPRs, because
Tripp et al. (2007) report that by 2006, illicit seed marketing had spread to the extent that the legitimate varieties hardly command any price premium.
Traxler, Godoy-Avila, Falck-Zepeda, and EspinozaArellan (2001) and Thirtle, Beyers, Ismail, and Piesse
(2003) report that prices of seed for Bt cotton varieties
in Mexico and South Africa were about two-thirds more
than non-Bt varieties, for at least two successive years in
each case. Both countries have fairly strong IPRs for
seeds, and in both cases the seed companies prohibited
farmers’ own replanting and used marketing restrictions
to help enforce it. In the enforcement environment of
these two countries, the companies were able to lease
the trait as a non-durable—at least for the two years of
the study.
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Bt cotton in Argentina represents an instructive
empirical case. Qaim and de Janvry (2003) documented
that official adopters paid a seed premium of 617% during the 1999-2000 season, and 463% the following season, which resulted in official adoption rates of only
5.4%. They calculated that the optimum seed price in a
static framework should have been about half the price
actually charged, and concluded that global marketing
considerations must have led the seed company to overprice the seed. However, they also report a black market
price of the Bt variety at one-third the official price.
This and the earlier total loss of control of the RoundupReady soybean trait (Qaim & Traxler, 2005) make it
pretty clear that enforcement of IPRs in Argentina was
totally ineffective at that time. This closely corresponds
to the non-IPR scenario with myopic buyers, in which
the trait owner charges a very high price the first year
(years in this case), then plans on little or no subsequent
sales, as had been the case for RR soybeans.

Conclusions
We have set about to examine theoretically plausible
intertemporal pricing patterns for, and welfare outcomes
from, the emerging markets for crop traits. Given the
potential durability of these traits, we were especially
interested in the circumstances under which the Coase
conjecture might deprive owners of crop traits the
opportunity to earn rents. To do this, we derived equilibrium intertemporal price paths for each of six stylized
market structures, consisting of two alternative assumptions about farmers’ expectations regarding future trait
price (myopia versus foresight), three IPR systems
(strong patents, strong plant breeders rights [PBRs], no
property rights), and whether or not the seller is able to
credibly commit to future price announcements.
We found that the Coase conjecture (durables sold at
or near marginal cost) is relevant to one market structure
that would appear to be relevant in many countries of
the world: the case of Plant Breeder’s Rights with farsighted buyers but sellers who are unable to credibly
commit to future price announcements. If sellers could
commit to a one-time-sale strategy, they could earn normal monopoly profit, but it would be difficult to convince far-sighted buyers that there would be no future
sales, given that the owner would clearly benefit from
them (the time-inconsistency problem). Patent holders,
on the other hand, can avoid this Coasian pitfall by leasing the trait for annual use only (a common practice
among patent holders, not available to PBR holders),
thereby achieving normal monopoly rents from the trait.

While it does not seem that buyers could be totally
myopic about future trait prices, social welfare benefits
from the traits would be nearly maximized if they were,
regardless of the status of property rights. In that circumstance, monopoly trait owners could practice intertemporal price discrimination, whether property rights
are held as patents or PBRs. In so doing, they would
earn more than normal monopoly profits, while at the
same time buyers are not significantly worse off than for
the case of standard monopoly pricing (under plausible
discount rates and time horizons). This is because nearly
all potential buyers benefit to some degree under price
discrimination, whereas only half benefit (though to a
greater extent each) under standard monopoly pricing.
Total social welfare from a trait is maximized when
there are no effective property rights, because full adoption at low or zero cost occurs. However, trait owners
can realize virtually none of that benefit, unless buyers
are myopic, and the incentive for creating new traits is
lost. This is completely consistent with standard theory
that patents create allocative inefficiency in order to
increase overall social efficiency with a larger number
of inventions.
The assumptions of the analysis here are highly stylized. Not all buyers are myopic, and not all have good
foresight, and our analysis does not account for markets
in which a mix of these types exists. IPRs are not costless nor are they costlessly enforceable, nor are there
many jurisdictions where no IPRs at all exist. The real
world is somewhere in between, but the results derived
here nonetheless provide insights as to the important
issues and tendencies. Traits are not characterized by
abrupt obsolescence as characterized here, but introducing a standard depreciation rate into the model used here
would not change the general nature of the results.
Hence we believe that the above conclusions are relevant to policy debates regarding the value of the different types of IPRs, and to the academic discussions of the
potential relevance of Coase’s conjecture.
The most logical extension of the work here would
be a test of whether the general results are consistent
with empirical price paths observed under alternative
IPR systems. To date, we have not been able to put
together a sufficient amount of data to allow any meaningful tests of these results, though we have provided
some evidence from other studies. Extension of the
models here to the case of oligopoly in the trait market
might well add further understanding of trait price trajectories, as might incorporation of tie-in sales with nondurable goods such as pesticides.
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